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thority to confer additional powers upon the Public Utilities Commission. This
authority is "plenary and unlimited,"3 7 except for the qualification that such addi-
tional powers must be "cognate and germane" to the regulation and control of
public utilities.38 Thus a municipal regulation affecting a matter of statewide con-
cern will be preempted by a power conferred upon the Public Utilities Commis-
sion if the two are in conflict. The power to regulate railroad crossings has been
conferred upon the Public Utilities Commission and the regulation of these cross-
ings is of statewide concern. Therefore, municipal ordinances which regulate the
time for which a tram may block a railroad crossing are in conflict with this
power and are void.
Kenneth A. Giranberg*
authority of the Legislature to confer upon the Public Utilities Commission additional
powers of the same land or different from those conferred herein which are not incon-
sistent with the powers conferred upon the Public Utilities Comiission in this Constitu-
tion, and the authority of the Legislature to confer such additional powers is expressly
declared to be plenary and unlimited by any provision of this Constitution." CAL. CONST.
art. XII, § 22.
37 Ibid.
38 Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Eshleman, 166 Cal. 640, 656, 702, 137 Pac. 1119, 1124,
1143 (1913).
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THE VALIDITY OF SAN FRANCISCO'S VEHICLE
REPAIR ORDINANCE
The San Francisco Municipal Traffic Code provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to construct or cause
to be constructed or repair or cause to be repaired any vehicle or any part of any
vehicle upon any public street except such repairs as may be necessary in case
of an accident or breakdown to enable the removal of said vehicle from the
street.'
While tins ordinance is more rigid than the general rule,2 the congested streets of
San Francisco may justify this strictness. However, whatever merit the ordinance
has is irrelevant if San Francisco, as a municipal corporation, lacks the power to
make and-enforce such an ordinance. It is the purpose of this note to demonstrate
that the city does indeed lack the necessary power.
This will be attempted in a two-step analysis. First, it will be shown that the
subject matter does not constitute a municipal affair. Therefore, the ordinance is
1 SAx FhAicisco, CAL., Tn ,mFic CODE § 65 (1963).
260 CJ.S. Motor Vehle § 331 (1949) states that the operator of a motor
vehicle generally has the right to stop on a highway and make any repairs so long as
he assumes the same duties- as would rest on him in the case of a stop for any other
purpose (where the vehicle is able to proceed safely under its own power though in
need of repairs).
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only valid if not in conflict with general law. Second, while the ordinance does
not expressly contradict or duplicate general law, it will be shown that it does
attempt to make unlawful, behavior which, because of the complete occupation
of the field of traffic regulation by State law, has been implicitly sanctioned by
general law. The ordinance therefore conflicts with general law and is mvalid.
Municipal Power to Regulate in the Field of Traffic Regulation
The power of a municipal corporation in California to make and enforce ordi-
nances m the field of traffic regulation is generally derived from either of two
sections in the California constitution, as well as from numerous provisions in the
California Vehicle Code. The first relevant section of the constitution states:
Cities and towns hereafter organized under charters framed and adopted by
authority of this [Califorma] Constitution are hereby empowered to make
and enforce all laws and regulations in respect to municipal affairs, subject only
to the restrictions and limitations provided in their several charters, and in
respect to other matters they shall be subject to and controlled by general laws.3
Since San Francisco is a chartered city, if the regulation of vehicles being re-
paired on its streets is a municipal affair, its vehicle repair ordinance would be
valid even if in conflict with general law.
Municipal corporations in California generally base their power to make and
enforce ordinances in the field of traffic regulation on another section of the State
constitution. That section provides: "Any county, city, town, or township may
make and enforce within its limits all such local, police, sanitary and other regula-
tions as are not in conflict with general laws."4 Thus, even if the regulation of
vehicle repair on city streets is not a municipal affair, the vehicle repair ordinance
would be valid if it is not in conflict with State law.
Vehicle Repair on City Streets as a Municipal Affair
Unless a subject is strictly an internal business affair of the mumcipality, it is
more likely than not that when presented with the question the court will construe
the subject as of statewide concern rather than as a municipal affair.5 The regula-
tion of the repair of vehicles on city streets is not strictly an internal business af-
fair in California because the city streets belong to the people of the State.6 Since
3 CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 6. See also CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 8(j).
4 CAL. CoNsT. art. XI, § 11.
5 See TWA v. City & County of San Francisco, 228 F.2d 473 (9th Cir.), cert.
dented, 351 U.S. 919 (1956); Ex parte Danels, 183 Cal. 636, 639, 192 Pac. 442, 444
(1920); Lossman v. City of Stockton, 6 Cal. App. 2d 324, 328, 44 P.2d 397, 399
(1935); cf. Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 276, 32
Cal. Rptr. 830, 384 P.2d 158 (1963). For an analytical discussion of the municipal
affairs concept see Note, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 265 (1964). For a discussion and example
of one land of problem raised by that concept see Note, 17 HAsnNcs L.J. 635 (1966).
6 Ex parte Danels, 183 Cal. 636, 192 Pac. 442 (1920); See People v. County of
Mann, 103 Cal. 223, 37 Pac. 203 (1894); Helmer v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. App.
140, 191 Pac. 1001 (1920); but of. City & County of Denver v. Henry, 95 Colo. 582,
38 P.2d 895 (1934), where the court stated that unlike Califorma's constitution, the
Colorado constitution contains no express limitation to the effect that a municipality
may not make regulations in conflict with general law. Therefore, while Colorado's
"matters of local concern" are broad enough to permit local traffic regulation in
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the city streets are not the exclusive property of the municipality, any regulation
of their use is not an internal business affair but an affair of interest to all the
people of the State.
The construction of off-street parking facilities has been classified as a municipal
affair.7 However, this classification has never been extended to include the regula-
tion of all parking. Pipoly v. Bensons clarifies the position of parking by stating
that while the legislative declaration 9 that traffic should be uniform throughout
the State constitutes an express occupation of the entire field of traffic regulation,
the Vehicle Code expressly leaves several areas for local control, including the
regulation of parking.O These areas are left for local control because of these ex-
press provisions in the Vehicle Code, not because they are municipal affairs."
The legislature has not left the regulation of all parking to local control, but has
given local authorities the power to enact and enforce only certain kinds of park-
ing regulations.' 2 The extent of legislation on parking, within the Vehicle Code,
indicates legislative intent to promote uniform parking regulations throughout the
State except in particular matters where local authorities are expressly given regu-
latory power.'s The lands of permissible local parking regulation exist because of
express provisions in the California Vehicle Code, not because they are municipal
affairs.
Another reason for treating regulation of the repair of vehicles on city streets
as a matter of statewide concern, rather than as a municipal affair, is the public
policy which favors statewide uniformity in areas where a citizen might reasonably
expect it.14 The legislature's expression that the regulation of traffic is a field
where uniformity is desired 15 was probably generated by the belief that this was
a field where a citizen might reasonably expect uniformity.16 Because regulation of
vehicle repair on city streets is not an internal business affair of the municipality, and
because the regulation of parking is not a municipal affair, and because public
policy favors statewide uniformity in the field of traffic regulation, the classifica-
tion of the regulation of the repair of parked vehicles on city streets as a municipal
conflict with State law, Califorma's "municipal affairs" have been defined far more
narrowly.
7 Mallon v. City of Long Beach, 44 Cal. 2d 199, 211, 282 P.2d 481, 488 (1955);
Larsen v. City & County of San Francisco, 152 Cal. App. 2d 355, 313 P.2d 959 (1957).
8 20 Cal. 2d 366, 125 P.2d 482 (1942).
o CAL. VEDicLE CODE § 21.
'0 Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal. 2d 366, 372, 125 P.2d 482, 486 (1942).
lt Ibid.
' 2 See CAL. VEmcLE CODE §§ 22500(k) (allowing parking on bridges), 22507
(prohibiting or restricting vehicle parking), 22508 (establishing parking meter zones),
22509 (regulating parking on hills), 22519 (regulation of off-street parking).
13 Sections on Parking, Removal of Parked Vehicles, and Parking Lots are included
in the "Rules of the Road" division of the Vehicle Code. (CAL. VEHEcrx CODE §§ 21000-
23336.)
14_In re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 111, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857, 864, 372 P.2d 897, 904 (1962)
(concurring opinion); see Blease & O'Connor, Civil Liberties and the Proposed Changes
in the Law of Preemption 14-15 (1965) (unpublished report in Umversity of California
Law School Library, Berkeley).
15 CA. VEHICLE CODE § 21.
'6 See CAL. VEHCL. CODE §§ 21103, 21109, 21111, requirimg the local authority
to post signs or warnings before a local ordinance may be enforced.
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affair is at least doubtful. The rule that if the classification is reasonably doubtful,
the doubt must be resolved against the subjecet's being a municipal affair,17 dis-
courages a conclusion that the vehicle repair ordinance could be upheld as being
within the power of a chartered city to regulate its municipal affairs.
Prohibition of Vehicle Repair on City Streets as in Conflict
with General Law
Most State legislation in the field of traffic regulation is found in the California
Vehicle Code.18 This code provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided the provisions of this code are ap-
plicable and uniform throughout the State and all counties and municipalities
thereto, and no local authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance on the
matters covered by this code unless expressly authorized hereto. 19
Although the Vehicle Code does expressly authorize local authorities to enact and
enforce ordinances in several areas, 2° an express provision giving a local authority
the power to enact and enforce ordinances regulating the repair of vehicles on
city streets is not included.
However, as a general rule municipalities have the power to regulate the use
of their streets so long as this regulation does not conflict with general law.
21
Although the regulation of the repair of motor vehicles on city streets is not a
municipal affair, the San Francisco vehicle repair ordinance is valid unless it some-
how conflicts with State law.
A conflict may arise in one of three ways: where the local ordinance contra-
dicts State law,22 where it duplicates State law,2 3 or where it attempts to regulate
m a field occupied by State law to such a degree that the ordinance would neces-
sarily be mconsistent.24 Prior to the declaration of uniformity and the express
17 Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 674, 3 Cal. Rptr. 158, 349 P.2d 974
(1960); City of Salinas v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 72 Cal. App. 2d 494, 164 P.2d 905
(1046).
18 The Penal Code also contains regulatory legislation of a generally more serious
nature not relevant to this note.
19 CAL. VEmCLE CODE § 21.
2oStatutes cited note 12 supra; CAL. VEmcLu CODE §§ 21100 (regulating
processions, licensing and regulating vehicles for hire, regulating by traffic officers,
regulating by control devices), 21101 (designating one-way highways, dosing of high-
ways, designating through highways, prohibiting use of particular highways by certain
vehicles, closing streets temporarily to conduct driver training programs), 21102
(closing streets dividing school grounds), 22651, 22652 (removal of vehicles by city
police and sheriffs, as well as by Califorma Highway Patrol), 21106 (establishing cross-
walks), 21109 (regulating traffic in subways, tunnels, bridges and viaducts), 21107,
21108, 21111 (regulating traffic on private roads and within housing projects), 22519
(regulating off-street parking). For a discussion of the requirement for strict
construction of such express authorizations see People v. Moore, 229 Cal. App. 2d 221,
40 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1964).
21Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal. 2d 366, 125 P.2d 482 (1942); Ex parte Daniels, 183
Cal. 636, 192 Pac. 442 (1920).
22 Ex parte Daniels, supra note 21.
2 3 In re Sic, 73 Cal. 142, 14 Pac. 405 (1887).
24 In re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857, 372 P.2d 897 (1962); Compare
In re Hubbard, 62 Cal. 2d 119, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393, 396 P.2d 809 (1964).
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occupation of the field of traffic regulation by the State as provided in the Cali-
forna Vehicle Code, an ordinance within the field of traffic regulation was valid
if it did not attempt to make lawful the performance of an act forbidden by State
law or attempt to prohibit what State law affirmatively authorized. 25 A local au-
thority was able to make such new and additional regulations in aid and further-
ance of the purpose of State law as seemed fit and appropriate to the necessities
of the particular locality.
26
Apparently rejecting the doctrine of preemption by implication, the court in
Mann v. Scott2 7 declared: "[I]t does not follow that, because the legislature has
seen fit to distinguish between urban and rural communities it has thereby
impliedly prohibited the enactment of additional local regulations by mumcipali-
ties in keeping with the purpose of the general law."28 Ignoring the possible
merits of statewide uniformity of regulation, which the doctrine of preemption by
implication has been developed to promote,2 9 the court stated that it is better to
allow municipalities to enact local ordinances in fields where the legislature has
assumed a course of extensive prohibitory enactments in aid and furtherance of
this general law because of the "special requirements" of urban communities.3
0
But because of the judicial and legislative recognition of the increasing vehicular
mobility of the California population and the consequent need for uniform state-
wide traffic regulation, the aid and furtherance principle has been virtually elim-
mated in the field of traffic regulation. The principle was held inapplicable to the
regulation of driving under the influence of intoxicating beverages31 and to the
regulation of speed on city streets,32 and, therefore, by implication of both of
these cases, to the regulation of any matter involving vehicle travel, 3 even before
the adoption of a declaration of uniformity and occupation by the legislature.
After the legislative declaration of uniformity and occupation 4 had been made,
the court in Pipoh v. Benson35 declared that the entire area of traffic regulation
ceased to be a matter of local regulation not only because of this declaration, but
primarily because of the precedent established in Ex parte Danzels.36
According to Pipoly, only in areas left for local control did local authorities
have the power to enact and enforce ordinances. While the Vehicle Code section
giving local authorities power to prohibit or restrict the parking of vehicles on
25 See Mann v. Scott, 180 Cal. 550, 182 Pac. 281 (1919), which refused to
consider a 1915 statute expressly limiting the scope of local regulation of speed because
it was not i effect at the time of the accident involved in the case.
2 6Inre Hoffman, 155 Cal. 114, 99 Pac. 517 (1909).
27 180 Cal. 550, 182 Pac. 281 (1919).
28 Id. at 557, 182 Pac. at 284.
29 Blease & O'Connor, op. cit. supra note 14; of. In re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 22 Cal.
Rptr. 857, 372 P.2d 897 (1962); Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 674, 3 Cal.
Rptr. 158, 349 P.2d 974 (1960); Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal. 2d 366, 125 P.2d 482
(1942).
3 0 Mann v. Scott, 180 Cal. 550, 182 Pac. 281 (1919).
31 Helmer v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. App. 140, 191 Pac. 1001 (1920).
s2 Ex parte Daniels, 183 Cal. 636, 192 Pac. 442 (1920).
33 Helmer v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. App. 140, 191 Pac. 1001 (1920); Ex parte
Daniels, supra note 32.
3 4 CAL. VEmcLE CODE § 21.
385 Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal. 2d 366, 125 P.2d 482 (1942).
36 183 Cal. 636, 639, 192 Pac. 442, 444 (1920).
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certain streets8 7 might be interpreted as a grant of power to prohibit the parking
of velucles being repaired on all city streets, such a liberal interpretation is un-
likely. The wording of this section only gives a municipality the power to prohibit
or restrict the parking of all vehicles on certain streets.8 A reasonable mterpreta-
tion of this statute could not enable a local authority to prohibit the parking of
certain types of vehicles on all city streets. The rule that in cases of doubtful au-
thority the doubt is resolved against the local authority3 9 precludes this liberal
interpretation.
However, the San Francisco vehicle repair ordinance falls within an area
where the legislature has not only failed to give local authorities the power to
enact and enforce ordinances, but also has not itself enacted statewide legislation.
The only section in the Vehicle Code mentioning, in effect, parking of vehicles in
need of repair applies to unincorporated areas. 40 This factor may favor the validity
of the vehicle-repair-parking ordinance if Mecchz v. Lyon Van & Storage Co.41
is followed. That case held: "[W]hen the state confines its exercise of authority
to specified highways, there is scope left to the municipal authority, and the
exercise of authority within that scope creates no conflict or inconsistency with
the legislative scheme." 42
In expressly referring to Mecchz, the court in Pipoly stated that this case up-
held "the generally recognized right of local authorities to enact additional local
regulations,"43 but went on to hold: "While the principle thus announced is the
general rule it does not have application where the Legislature has clearly
indicated its intention of occupying the field completely."
44
Pipoly, in considering the regulation of pedestrian traffic, indicated its concept
of what constituted occupation of the field, stating that prior to the legislature's
first enactment of regulations dealing with pedestrian rights and duties in 1931,
additional local regulation was proper "since pedestrian rights and duties were
not at that time within the field covered by the state legislation."45 The court then
stated: "A similar situation was presented in Mecohz v. Lyon Van & Storage Co.
"46 This expression seems to indicate that the court in Pipoly considered that
the area of parking regulation dealt with in Mecchz was not within the field
covered by State legislation. However, such an interpretation would be erroneous
since shortly after tins expression the court admitted that there is State regulation
8
7 CAL. VEBICLE CODE § 22507.
38 Ibid.
39 Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 674, 3 Cal. Rptr. 158, 349 P.2d 974
(1960).
40 CAL. VEH-cLE CODE § 22504: a) Upon any highway in unincorporated areas no
person shall stop, park, or leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended,
upon the roadway when it is practicable to stop, park, or leave the vehicle off such
portion of the highway b) This section shall not apply to the driver of any vehicle
which is disabled m such a manner and to such extent that it is impossible to avoid
stopping and temporarily leaving the disabled vehicle on the roadway.
4138 Cal. App. 2d 674, 102 P.2d 422 (1940).
42 Id. at 681, 102 P.2d at 425.
43 Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal. 2d 366, 373-74, 125 P.2d 482, 486 (1942).
44 Id. at 374, 125 P.2d at 486.
45 Id. at 374, 125 P.2d at 487.
46 Ibtd.
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on the matter of parking, but that the legislature has permitted local authorities
"to make supplementary regulations upon this particular phase of traffic regula-
tion "47
Only the regulation of parking on "certain streets or highways" is expressly
left to local authorities, 48 not the regulation of certain types of vehicles on all city
streets. Since the regulation of the repair of vehicles in city streets is not an area
expressly left to local authorities, the vehicle repair ordinance is valid only if this
area of traffic regulation is left to local regulation by implication.
Dictum in Ex parte Daniels49 declares that a legislative prohibition of local regu-
lation in a particular field precludes local regulation within this field only if the
legislature has also taken some affirmative act and thereby actually occupied the
particular field. A mere declaration that local authorities cannot enact or enforce
an ordinance on a particular matter without actually providing legislation on this
matter to justify such a declaration is an unconstitutional usurpation of the right
of a local authority to enact or enforce regulations within its limits not in conflict
with general law.5 0
However, the Califorma Supreme Court, in the case of In re Lane,5U held
that by the fact that the State had prohibited many activities in the field of the
criminal aspects of sexual activity, the entire field was preempted by general law.
Extensive prohibitory regulation in the field was held to imply a legislative intent
fully to occupy the field and thereby preclude local regulation of conduct not
covered by State legislation.52 But the concurring opimon by Chief Justice Gibson
in Lane53 discusses the requirements necessary to make extensive regulation con-
stitute enough of a comprehensive scheme to preempt the subject of the regula-
tion. These requirements include not only quantity, but also scope and quality of
State legislation, and they determine whether the legislature intends to occupy a
field to the exclusion of local regulations attempting to impose additional require-
ments in the field.
54
Chief Justice Gibson's analysis was apparently of some aid in In re Hubbard,55
where the California Supreme Court held that although the legislature had en-
acted certain statutes in the field of gambling, these were not extensive enough in
scope to constitute complete occupation of the field. Because the State legislation
was aimed at specific games rather than at the whole field, there was no implica-
tion that those games of chance not considered were thereby made lawful.56
Since the subject matter was not fully covered by general law, and since the State
legislation that did exist was not couched in terms clearly indicating that para-
mount State concern would not tolerate further local action, and since the subject
matter was not of such a nature as to make the need for statewide uniformity out-
47 Ibid.
48 The grant of power is found in CAL. VEmcrn CoDE § 22507.
49 183 Cal. 636, 641, 192 Pac. 442, 445 (1920).
50 Ibid.
5158 Cal. 2d 99, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857, 372 P.2d 897 (1962).
52 Ibid., see Blease & O'Connor, op. cit. supra note 14, at 9.
5858 Cal. 2d 99, 108, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857, 861, 372 P.2d 897, 901 (1962) (con-
cumng opinion).
54 See Blease & O'Connor, op. cit. supra note 14, at 9.
55 62 Cal. 2d 119, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393, 396 P.2d 809 (1964).
56 Ibid.
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weigh the benefits of local regulation, gambling remained an area where local
regulation was permitted. 57
The field of the regulation of the criminal aspects of sexual activity in Lane
and the field of traffic regulation are, according to ]udicial interpretation, fields
where the need for statewide uniformity outweighs the benefits of local regula-
tion. The legislature has also expressed its desire to provide statewide uniformity
in the field of traffic regulation. With the benefit of an express declaration of
legislative intent to occupy the field of traffic regulation,58 the court in Pipoly
declared that except where the Vehicle Code left regulatory power in local au-
thorities, traffic regulation ceased to be a field where local authorities could enact
and enforce ordinances.59
Pipoly stated that local regulation was permitted not only where the Vehicle
Code expressly permits supplementary regulation but also where a particular
matter was not within the field covered by State legislation. 60 The vehicle repair
ordinance under consideration here deals with a matter not expressly covered by
State law. However, if the Lane approach to preemption is applied to the field
of traffic regulation, the field must be considered covered by such extensive legis-
lation that conduct not expressly made unlawful by the State is implicitly lawful
for two reasons: first, because of the absence of State legislation to the contrary
in this field, and second, because the nature of the subject makes the need for
statewide uniformity outweigh the possible benefits of local regulation.
The Lane interpretation seems to upset the earlier Pipoly concept of the effect
on local regulation when the State occupies a field. According to Pipoly, a local
authority can regulate in a field occupied by State legislation if a particular matter
within the field is not covered by State legislation.61 Under the Lane rule, if a
field is occupied by State legislation there is no room for local regulation unless
the legislature expressly provides to the contrary.62 Any matters within such a
field not covered by State law are implicitly lawful and not subject to local probi-
bition.63
However, the "matters" referred to in Pipoly included the broad areas of
parking and pedestrian traffic, 64 rather than narrower "matters," such as the regu-
lation of the repair of motor vehicles on city streets. Using Pipoly's concept of
"matter," the Vehicle Codes preemption of "matters covered by this code,"6 5
would exclude from preemption any significant area of traffic regulation not
covered by the Vehicle Code, but would not save from preemption matters con-
stituting lesser included parts of an area covered by the Vehicle Code. Since the
area of parking regulation is now covered by the Vehicle Code, 66 the lesser in-
eluded matter of the regulation of the repair of parked vehicles is a matter
covered by the Vehicle Code.
57 Id. at 128, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 399, 396 P.2d at 815.
58 CAL. VEmCLE CODE § 21.
59 Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal. 2d 366, 125 P.2d 482 (1942).
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 In re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857, 372 P.2d 897 (1962).
63 Ibid.
64 Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal. 2d 366, 125 P.2d 482 (1942).
65 CAL. VEMCLE CODE § 21.
66 Statutes cited note 12 supra.
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Even if the Pipoly interpretation would find that the matter of regulation of
the repair of parked vehicles is not a matter covered by the Vehicle Code, Lane
has apparently modified this interpretation. Where the quantity, quality, and
scope of state legislation is so extensive as to occupy the entire field of regulation,
unless there is a declaration that complete occupation is not intended, as, for
instance, was the case in In re Iverson,67 a local authority lacks the power to
legislate in the field except regarding matters expressly permitted by the legis-
lature. Since the regulation of the repair of motor vehicles on city streets is within
a field completely occupied by State law and is not expressly left for local enact-
ment and enforcement, San Francisco's vehicle repair ordinance is invalid and
unenforceable.
Gary Snyder*
67199 Cal. 582, 250 Pac. 681 (1926), where the statute expressly provided that
nothing in it "shall be construed as limiting the power of any city to prohibit the
manufacture, sale, transportation or possession of intoxicating liquors for beverage
purposes." Cal. Stat. 1921, ch. 80, § 4, at 79.
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